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ABSTRACT
Mental and behavioral disorders represent a significant portion of
the public health burden in all countries. The human cost of these
disorders is immense, yet treatment options for sufferers are currently
limited, with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to available
interventions and drugs. High quality ontologies facilitate data aggre-
gation and comparison across different disciplines, and may therefore
speed up the translation of primary research into novel therapeutics.
Realism-based ontologies describe entities in reality and the rela-
tionships between them in such a way that - once formulated in a
suitable formal language - the ontologies can be used for sophistica-
ted automated reasoning applications. Reference ontologies can be
applied across different contexts in which different, and often mutually
incompatible, domain-specific vocabularies have traditionally been
used. In this contribution we describe the Mental Functioning Onto-
logy (MF) and Mental Disease Ontology (MD), two realism-based
ontologies currently under development for the description of human
mental functioning and disease. We describe the structure and upper
levels of the ontologies and preliminary application scenarios, and
identify some open questions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Mental disorders are common in all countries, representing a signi-
ficant portion of the public health burden. In the US, about one
in four adults is diagnosed with a mental disorder in a given year,
and about one in seventeen is thought to suffer from a serious and
disabling mental illness. Mental disorders are the leading cause of
disability in the United States and Canada for persons aged 15 to
44 (National Advisory Mental Health Council Workgroup, 2010).
The cost of these disorders is immense, affecting not only patients
but also their caregivers, rendering adults unable to work producti-
vely, destroying relationships and increasing the financial burden
on society. Treatment options for sufferers are currently limited,
with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to currently avai-
lable interventions, which include psychotherapeutic, somatic, and
pharmacological actions. And, while there is enormous variance in
individual responses to therapeutic agents, there is often little alter-
native for the clinician other than trial and error in determining the
best treatment strategy for the patient’s genetic, physiological, or
behavioral profile.
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The volume of data, information and knowledge, both in patient
records and in scientific literature, is steadily increasing. Computer-
based methods able to harness such data are mandatory for sup-
porting decision-making processes in the treatment of individual
patients as well as in the interpretation of scientific findings. Whe-
reas, traditionally, most relevant information has only been available
as free text, machine processing increasingly requires the adhere-
nce to terminological standards (Freitas et al., 2009). This need
has been addressed by the development of controlled vocabularies
such as SNOMED CT (International Health Terminology Standards
Development Organization, 2012), and classification systems such
as the International Classification of Diseases (World Health Orga-
nization, 2012) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) (APA, 2000). DSM provides not only a classifica-
tion of disorders but also guidance as to the diagnostic criteria for
these disorders in the form of checklists of symptoms, with counts
of how many symptoms of a various sort are required for the con-
dition to be diagnosed. The DSM is currently in its fourth revision,
but the fifth revision is scheduled for release in May 2013 (Regier
et al., 2009), and a draft version of the revisions have been rele-
ased for public review at www.dsm5.org. Some issues that the
revision will try to address are a high occurrence of co-morbidity
of disorders according to the diagnostic criteria and the high use of
‘catch-all’ categories such as ‘not otherwise specified’. To address
these, the revision is expected to emphasize dimensional measures
of symptoms that cross diagnostic category boundaries.
Terminology systems and controlled vocabularies address some
of the requirements of computational support for data manage-
ment, but in recent years a more powerful solution has become
available in the form of formal ontologies. Realism-based ontolo-
gies are formalized descriptions that are based on scientific theories
about the nature of entities in reality and the relationships betw-
een them (Smith, 2008; Munn and Smith, 2009; Rubin et al.,
2008). These ontologies may be expressed in a formal language and
enhanced with standard identifiers, labels and definitions that are
intended to facilitate unambiguous interpretation and annotation. A
key advantage that such ontologies confer, over and above the mere
standardization of terminologies, is that their underlying logical for-
malisms are natural language-independent and formally rigorous.
This allows these ontologies to form the backbone of sophisticated
automated reasoning applications, and to be applied across contexts
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in which multiple competing domain-specific vocabularies have tra-
ditionally been used (Stenzhorn et al., 2008). Especially in the
domain of biomedicine, ontologies have found a broad acceptance.
In the next section, we will describe the structure and upper
levels of the Mental Functioning (MF) and Mental Disease (MD)
ontologies. Thereafter, we provide a preliminary listing of possible
application scenarios for these ontologies. Finally, we identify some
open questions in the ontology of mental functioning.
2 ONTOLOGY STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
2.1 Mental Functioning Ontology
Based on the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO, Grenon and Smith
(2004)) and being developed in the context of the OBO Foundry
(Smith et al., 2007) library of interrelated modular domain ontolo-
gies, the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF, (Hastings et al., 2012))
is a modular domain ontology aiming to represent all aspects of
mental functioning, including mental processes such as cognitive
processes and qualities such as intelligence. MF grounds mental
functioning entities in an upper level ontology, and gives a framew-
ork within which mental functioning can be related to ontological
descriptions of related entities in other domains such as neuroa-
natomy and biochemistry. Modules of MF that are actively under
development are those for cognition, perception and emotion.
Figure 1 illustrates the upper levels of the ontology, based on the
framework laid out in (Ceusters and Smith, 2010a), together with
the alignment to BFO. At the top level, BFO introduces a distinction
between continuants and occurrents. Occurrents are processes and
other entities that unfold in time, i.e. entities that have temporal
parts. Continuants, on the other hand, are those things that exist in
full at all times that they exist, have no temporal parts, and continue
to exist over an extended period of time. This distinction can be seen
in the context of mental functioning between, for example, an orga-
nism, or a part of an organism’s anatomy, that continues to exist over
time (thus is a continuant), and an organism’s thinking process that
spans over a few minutes (unfolding in time) before it is completed
(thus is an occurrent). Within continuants, BFO further distingui-
shes between those entities that are independent and those that are
dependent. Independent continuants can exist by themselves, while
dependent continuants are those sorts of things that need a “bearer”
in order to exist, such as colours, social roles, or behavioral disposi-
tions that are realized in behavior, an occurent entity. ‘Functioning’
is defined as the realization of a function, where a function is a spe-
cial type of disposition that is realized in end-directed activity that
is appropriate for the kind or kinds of contexts for which the bea-
rer is designed or in which the bearer has evolved (Arp and Smith,
2008). In the domain of the mental, therefore, mental functionings
are those mental processes that are realizations of functions; pro-
cesses that have been positively selected for by human evolution.
While cognition, remembering, and emotion can all be examples
of mental functionings, examples of mental processes that are not
functionings include the auditory perception involved in tinnitis and,
contentiously, possibly dreaming (if dreaming realizes a function at
all, which function it realizes is disputed).
The illustrated upper levels of MF show several important disti-
nctions in the framework to annotate and describe mental functio-
ning allowing interrelationships across a wide variety of different
levels of description. The organism is the fundamental indepen-
dent continuant in which mental functioning takes place. A mental
Fig. 1. The Mental Functioning Ontology upper level aligned to BFO.
Unlabelled arrows represent subsumption relations.
functioning related anatomical structure is that part of an organism
that bears a disposition to be the agent of a particular mental process.
So, for example, the particular neuronal and biochemical configu-
ration (i.e. the bona fide group of receptors and neurotransmitters
(Ceusters and Smith, 2010b)) that gives rise to a particular per-
son’s feeling of sadness is a mental functioning related anatomical
structure. Neurons and brain chemistry are themselves described
as continuants in other ontologies such as CHEBI for the neuro-
transmitters, the Protein Ontology (PR, Natale et al. (2011)) for
the receptors, and NeuroLex and BIRNlex (Bug et al., 2008) for
neurons and neuronal systems. These components can be linked
together as parts of the corresponding mental functioning related
anatomical structure, the boundaries of which are to be determined
with the advance of our understanding of the neurobiology and neu-
rochemistry of the physical basis of the various mental processes
involved. The links from entities in MF to the known biochemical
and neurobiological bases will be maintained in bridging modules,
ensuring that different levels of granularity and description can be
separately maintained. References to other vocabularies such as ICD
and BIRNlex will be annotated in the ontology where applicable.
Dispositions are properties that inhere in their bearers and con-
sist in the potential for certain processes in the bearer to occur when
this bearer comes into the right circumstances, for example, a glass
breaking when it is dropped onto a hard surface. An example of a
disposition in the domain of mental functioning is human persona-
lity. Personality (or character) is the kind of thing that is realized in
the behavioral interactions of a human being with the external world,
along with characteristic patterns of thought, such as in task perfor-
mance when learning new things. Personality may be measured by
standardised tests (which are information content entities concreti-
zed in, for example, the paper assessment questionnaires handed out
to subjects). Such tests - ideally - can be linked using something like
a ‘measures’ relation to the representation of personality in MF.
On the side of occurrents beneath BFO, MF includes mental pro-
cesses, which are defined as the processes that bring into being,
sustain or modify cognitive representations. Cognitive represen-
tations are dependent continuants that specifically depend on the
cognitive structures of an organism and contain cognitive content
which can take the form of thoughts or memories, representing such
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things as tables, people, smells, and colors. Mental processes –
manipulating those cognitive representations – include all of the
standard processual examples of mental functioning such as thin-
king, planning and learning or remembering. This is not say it is
straightforward to formalize these common notions of the entities
of mental functioning, but MF will focus as a major point of its
development on providing the most accurate representation for these
entities possible and appropriate at this level of description.
MF is being developed modularly, allowing different teams with
different core areas of expertise to focus on the extension of the ove-
rall ontology to describe the entities relevant to their scientific area.
One such extension is the Emotion Ontology (Hastings et al., 2011),
describing entities of relevance to all aspects of affective science.
Another extension covers the domain of mental disease.
2.2 Mental Disease Ontology
The Mental Disease Ontology (MD) is a separate ontology module
that aims to describe and categorize mental disorders based on the
strategy outlined in (Ceusters and Smith, 2010a). MD extends not
only the MF but also the Ontology for General Medical Science
(OGMS). OGMS is designed to interrelate ontologies in the medi-
cal domain to support research on Electronic Health Record (EHR)
technology and on the integration of clinical and research data. It
provides definitions for ‘disease’, ‘diagnosis’ and ‘disorder’, among
others, based on the terminology in (Scheuermann et al., 2009).
Following OGMS, a mental disease is defined as a disposition to
undergo pathological mental processes. A mental disease is a cli-
nically significant deviation from mental health. Mental health is
conformity of perception, emotion, and behavior internally and in
relation to the external real-world environment. In contrast, path-
ological mental processes are those that hinder well-being. Thus,
mental disease is a deviation from mental health that hampers the
bearer in his or her mental well-being (Ceusters and Smith, 2010a).
Figure 2 shows an extract of entities from MD for the domain of
substance addiction, a mental disease characterised by substance use
and phenomena such as tolerance, craving and withdrawal.
Fig. 2. Addiction in the Mental Disease Ontology.
For each mental disease, the ontology contains representations of
the symptoms and signs that are manifested in the disease course,
including pathological behavior. By differentiating a disease from a
disease course and by explicitly representing symptoms and signs
within a logically rigorous ontological framework that includes a
definition for mental disease, MF aims to address some of the chal-
lenges that have been observed with the DSM approach, such as
high levels of co-morbidity and the use of catch-all ‘not otherw-
ise specified’ placements. The DSM approach, termed ‘descriptive
psychiatry’, focuses on symptom assessment and confers disorder
status on specified thresholds of symptoms in terms of counts of
symptom types and tokens and durations of symptom episodes. For
example, a major depressive episode is stated to be diagnosable
if five of a set of nine symptoms are found to obtain within the
same two-week period. Symptoms include ‘insomnia or hyperso-
mnia nearly every day’ and ‘fatigue or loss of energy nearly every
day’. (Notice how these are not likely to be mutually exclusive.)
The DSM-5 proposal has also been criticised for promoting medi-
calisation of normal human experiences: grief, a normal human
emotion in response to bereavement, has been proposed as a type
of depression, a mental disorder (Cacciatore, 2012).
One symptom of substance addiction, for example, is a preoccu-
pation with use of the substance in question, a kind of non-canonical
(i.e. not in accordance with the environment, not conducive to well-
being) thinking process (since the organism is not able to control
the thinking process as they would in canonical thinking processes).
Furthermore, pathological (or non-canonical) processes are related
to the canonical versions of those processes. This interlinking of
symptoms to diseases and to canonical related processes in a compu-
table framework allows bridging from research involving different
diseases to research exploring ordinary functioning or underlying
mechanisms. It also allows hypotheses of mechanisms underlying
diseases to be made explicitly testable in terms of supporting data.
3 APPLICATIONS OF THE ONTOLOGIES
3.1 Standardisation
Ontologies are already widely used to facilitate standardised data-
base annotations throughout the biomedical sciences. To be truly
successful, this use case necessitates adoption of the principles of
the OBO Foundry such as the use of semantics-free stable unique
identifiers and the annotation of clear textual definitions for each
entity in the ontology. Databases containing data that could potenti-
ally be annotated with mental functioning terminology include those
in neuroscience such as BrainMap (Laird et al., 2005), a cura-
ted database of functional neuroimaging research studies. Many
more neuroscience databases are aggregated in the NIF webpages
(Gardner et al., 2008)). Beyond neuroscience, mental functioning
annotations are of increasing relevance in systems biology contexts
such as the BioModels database (Li et al., 2010). Mental functio-
ning is also particularly relevant for defining chemical influences in
biological systems, as done in ChEBI (de Matos et al., 2010).
An additional context where standardisation is of paramount
importance is in the organisation and maintenance of biobank data
in which human samples are stored for purposes of clinical research
(Krestyaninova et al., 2011). Often, in order to research underlying
mechanistic factors in rare diseases, samples from patients bearing
the condition may need to be sourced from multiple biobanks in
multiple countries or regions. Traditional systems which use local
(language and country-specific) terminologies to annotate the sam-
ple databases will certainly not be straightforward to integrate and
search across different sample collections. It is even more difficult
to interrelate sample data with EHR data and with known indicators
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in medical and biological knowledgebases such as those collecting
annotated genetic sequence information.
3.2 Behavioral and Cognitive Testing
Neuropsychological and psychometric tests are designed to obtain
information about brain functioning through behavioral expressi-
ons to determine the kind and dimension of dysfunction present
in a subject. These tests have putative links to various cognitive
domains like attention, language, episodic or semantic memory,
executive function, as well as general intellectual functioning, etc.
(Lezak et al., 2004). Tests are typically used as part of the clinical
picture that a physician develops to make a diagnosis in cases of
patient injury, neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer’s disease
and related dementias or deliriums, or paradigmatic mental diseases
such as dissociative or autistic spectrum disorders. The Neuropsych-
ological Testing Ontology (NPT) is currently under development to
represent many of these test procedures by describing the stimuli,
methods and responses, along with associated plan specifications
(Cox et al., 2012). These need to refer to mental functioning.
3.3 Population research: clinical questionnaires
Genetic and psychiatric population-wide research often relies on
diagnostic interviews which standardise the collection of data into
aspects of psychiatric functioning such that the data can be compa-
red and aggregated across large groups of patients. In the domain
of mental functioning, this is a particularly pressing problem since
many aspects of mental functioning are not directly observable, and
the assessment of mental functioning therefore relies on the subje-
ctive assessment of the trained practitioner and on self-reports by
the patient, who of course has no access to alternative experiences
of mental functioning other than his/her own. Standardised questi-
onnaires are thus an essential element of population research into
mental functioning. An example of such a questionnaire is the Dia-
gnostic Interview for Genetic Studies (Nurnberger et al., 1994), a
questionnaire used in clinical interviews to assess major mood and
psychotic disorders and related spectrum conditions. Linking the
symptoms assessed in such questionnaires to ontologies of men-
tal functioning provides the capability to standardise the collected
data across multiple such questionnaires. Furthermore, it allows
multi-level aggregation, rather than only aggregation at the level
of whether a particular disorder is diagnosed or not – which in
some cases may obscure rather than illuminate shared underlying
mechanisms and pathologies.
A concrete example here is a project funded by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) designed to obtain better insight into
the complexity of pain disorders, specifically concerning the asses-
sment of different pain types in the orofacial region, as well as into
pain-related disablement and its association with mental health and
quality of life. Five existing data collections compiled independen-
tly from each other have been made available for this study. The
data collections cover the same domain, but are distinct in various
respects: (1) some variables are identical across collections, oth-
ers involving, for instance, somatization, depression and anxiety,
are different because measured with in total 22 distinct assessment
instruments; (2) these instruments contain each between 50 and 500
unique assessment items, but, although frequently sharing intent,
do not share a similar presentation across forms, supporting detail,
instructions regarding the sources of information that can be used
to complete each item, or severity/frequency response scales that
are comparable across instruments; (3) because of their distinct ori-
gins, the data collections incorporate cultural influences related to
pain report that have an impact on the comparability of the colle-
ctions, despite the use of common instruments. One specific aim of
the project is to make these data collections comparable by building
a realism-based reference ontology for pain-related disablement,
mental health and quality of life (OPMQoL) following the principles
of Ontological Realism (Ceusters, 2012).
3.4 Translational research
Increasing the speed and throughput of the translation of primary
research in brain and mind science into novel therapeutic agents, and
ultimately clinical interventions, has been highlighted as a pressing
current concern for mental health research and practice (National
Advisory Mental Health Council Workgroup, 2010). However, this
effort is hindered by the disconnect between the different commu-
nities involved in primary research and the different levels needed
for the translation into therapeutics. Understanding the processes
involved in mental disorders requires research and integration of
knowledge across all the different levels of life science, from the
most fundamental such as genetic and biomolecular, through medi-
cal, brain and neurosciences, to the psychological and psychiatric
perspectives which focus on the behavioural and functional aspe-
cts. Recent breakthroughs in basic science in all of these different
levels have the potential to be exploited towards novel interven-
tions and therapeutics, but severe obstacles remain in the path of
translation, and there is still a resulting shortage of new agents and
approaches in the therapeutic pipeline (National Advisory Mental
Health Council Workgroup, 2010). Most importantly, ontologies
offer a common language that enables automated bridging betw-
een different disciplines, facilitating translation as research becomes
increasingly interdisciplinary. Furthermore, sophisticated querying
and hypothesis testing frameworks are able to be developed around
the ontologies.
4 OPEN QUESTIONS
A core open question for any effort to create an ontology for men-
tal functioning is in how to relate descriptions at the level of the
brain with descriptions at the level of the mental functioning. While
most modern biomedical researchers reject extreme views such as
mind-body dualism or outright eliminativism in favour of some
form of pragmatic embodied cognition, nevertheless the question
of the nature of the ontological relationship between mental functi-
oning entities and the purported corresponding brain processes is
disputed. The realism framework that MF is based on does not
imply physicalist reductionism, since we allow that there are mental
functionings which can be experienced in the first person, and which
are first-class entities in their own right.
The precise nature of the physical and neural basis for a mental
process is the subject of neuroscientific research, an appropriately
empirical question. MF aims to offer a framework within which
different types of empirical data can be compared as evidence for
different theoretical models. The problem of linking different levels
becomes more detailed when different levels of brain description are
considered – there is brain anatomy, brain activity as measured by
various different technological platforms, neuronal systems, neuro-
nal, and synaptic electrical and biochemical activity. Each of these
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different levels of description need to be categorised and related to
the description of the mental functioning of which they are a part.
Our approach follows that of (Ceusters and Smith, 2010a) in that
the definition of mental disease as “a clinically significant devia-
tion from mental health [. . . ] that hampers the bearer in his or her
mental well-being.” Determining what counts as a clinically signi-
ficant deviation from mental health can be challenging, as this can
differ depending on the environmental context. Another open chal-
lenge is that it is not possible to straightforwardly link symptoms,
such as behaviour, to the diseases that they are indicative of, since
such symptoms are usually not necessary conditions for the disease
(except in the case of markers). A challenge for MD and MF will be
to provide bridging modules that reconcile these aspects.
5 CONCLUSION
The ontology efforts that we have described aim to place mental
functioning in a central role within a broader evolving biologi-
cal and medical scientific context. Ontologies show great potential
for addressing many of the challenges of data management and
data-driven research in the post-genomic age of computer-assisted
science. However, to be successful such ontologies have to be
adopted by a wide, diverse community of users across different
but overlapping domains. We have highlighted some use cases
where adoption of the ontologies described could lead to benefits,
and raised some open questions where we believe interdisciplinary
discussions would contribute to the evolution of the framework.
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